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Summary
Background 10 days after the first reported case of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) 
infection in the Netherlands (on Feb 27, 2020), 55 (4%) of 1497 health-care workers in nine hospitals located in the 
south of the Netherlands had tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA. We aimed to gain insight in possible sources of 
infection in health-care workers.
Methods We did a cross-sectional study at three of the nine hospitals located in the south of the Netherlands. We 
screened health-care workers at the participating hospitals for SARS-CoV-2 infection, based on clinical symptoms 
(fever or mild respiratory symptoms) in the 10 days before screening. We obtained epidemiological data through 
structured interviews with health-care workers and combined this information with data from whole-genome 
sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 in clinical samples taken from health-care workers and patients. We did an in-depth 
analysis of sources and modes of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in health-care workers and patients.
Findings Between March 2 and March 12, 2020, 1796 (15%) of 12 022 health-care workers were screened, of whom 
96 (5%) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. We obtained complete and near-complete genome sequences from 50 health-
care workers and ten patients. Most sequences were grouped in three clusters, with two clusters showing local 
circulation within the region. The noted patterns were consistent with multiple introductions into the hospitals 
through community-acquired infections and local amplification in the community.
Interpretation Although direct transmission in the hospitals cannot be ruled out, our data do not support widespread 
nosocomial transmission as the source of infection in patients or health-care workers.
Funding EU Horizon 2020 (RECoVer, VEO, and the European Joint Programme One Health METASTAVA), and the 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health.
Copyright © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
4.0 license.
Introduction
In January, 2020, a cluster of patients with pneumonia 
of unknown cause was reported in Wuhan, China;1 
the disease was subsequently named COVID-19, caused 
by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2). The clinical spectrum of COVID-19 varies 
from asymptomatic or mild symp tomatic infections to 
severe respiratory symptoms and death, with older age 
groups generally presenting with more severe disease and 
higher death rates.2,3 Since its identification, SARS-CoV-2 
has rapidly spread across the globe. On June 22, 2020, 
177 countries had reported cases of COVID-19, adding up 
to more than 8·9 million reported cases and 468 000 deaths 
worldwide.4
Health-care workers are at increased risk of being 
exposed to SARS-CoV-2 and could potentially have a 
role in hospital transmission. Nosocomial outbreaks of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus and Middle 
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) are 
thought to have played a crucial part in the amplifi cation 
and spread of these viruses. For MERS-CoV, hospital 
outbreaks caused approximately 50% of confirmed cases, 
of which around 40% were in health-care workers.5 
Currently, the extent of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and risk 
factors associated with infection in health-care settings 
are unclear. During the WHO–China Joint Mission on 
COVID-19,3 2055 laboratory confirmed cases were reported 
in health-care workers from 476 hospitals in China, mostly 
(88%) from Hubei province. Most health-care workers were 
thought to have been infected within household settings 
rather than in a health-care setting, although conclusive 
evidence was scant.3
On Feb 27, 2020, the first patient in the Netherlands 
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA after returning from 
a holiday to Lombardy, Italy.6 In the following week, the 
number of infections in the country grew to 128, with an 
increasing proportion of cases without a known source of 
infection. These cases included nine health-care workers 
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from two hospitals in the province of North Brabant, in 
the south of the Netherlands.7,8 The Dutch national 
outbreak manage ment team advised to extend screening 
of health-care workers to other hospitals in North 
Brabant, to assess possible community transmission. 
From March 6 to March 8, 2020, 1097 employees of nine 
hospitals were tested, of whom 45 (4%) were positive for 
SARS-CoV-2.8 A follow-up study was done at three 
hospitals to assess the clinical presentations of COVID-19 
of these health-care workers.7 The impending shortage of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) and the proposed 
changes in its use in later phases of the outbreak 
response also triggered a debate on possible risks to 
health-care workers.9
To understand sources and modes of transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 in health-care workers and patients in the 
same hospitals, we did an in-depth analysis combining 
epidemiological data with whole-genome sequencing 
(WGS) of SARS-CoV-2 from clinical samples obtained 
from health-care workers and patients in three different 
hospitals
Methods
Study design and participants
We did a cross-sectional study at two teaching hospitals 
(Amphia Hospital, Breda, Netherlands [700 beds], and 
Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital, Tilburg, Netherlands 
[800 beds]) and one regional hospital (Bravis Hospital, 
Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom, Netherlands [600 beds]), 
at which 12 022 health-care workers in total were employed. 
PPE was used according to national guidelines that 
applied during this period of the outbreak.10,11 Patients with 
suspected COVID-19 were nursed under strict isolation 
precautions and health-care workers applied additional 
PPE (gowns, gloves, goggles, hair cover, and type IIR 
surgical masks) on entering the isolation room. When 
aerosol-generating procedures were done, an FFP2 mask 
was used.
All health-care workers at these three hospitals who had 
fever or mild respiratory symptoms in the 10 days before 
screening for SARS-CoV-2 infection were eligible for 
testing, which was voluntary. All patients testing positive 
for SARS-CoV-2 and who had been admitted 2 days or 
more before the last date of onset of symptoms of health-
care workers per hospital were included. All health-care 
workers with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection underwent 
a structured interview to obtain epidemiological data and 
to record any history of foreign travel and attendance at 
public events with more than 50 people, such as the yearly 
carnival in February, 2020 (appendix 1 p 1).
Ethics approval was obtained from the Medical Ethics 
Committee Brabant, with a waiver of written informed 
consent (METC Brabant/20.134/NW2020-26). Verbal 
informed consent was obtained from all health-care 
workers for SARS-CoV-2 testing, sequencing, and data 
collection. Data were deidentified before analysis. For 
patients, location and sequence data were obtained as 
part of the routine infection control policy in outbreak 
situations. All patients are notified of this policy on 
hospital admission and can actively dissent (opt out).
Procedures
We tested for SARS-CoV-2 infection using oropharyngeal 
or naso pharyn geal swabs in universal transport medium 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched Google Scholar on April 27, 2020, for articles 
published since 2020, with the keywords “SARS-CoV-2” AND 
“healthcare workers” AND “whole genome sequencing”. 
We did not restrict our search to a publication language. 
Our search retrieved 13 results. Two reports presented original 
research of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2); no reports were of the role of health-care 
workers in SARS-CoV-2 transmission or used whole-genome 
sequencing (WGS). Hospital transmission had an important 
role in previous outbreaks of Middle East respiratory 
syndrome and severe acute respiratory syndrome. The scarcity 
of personal protective equipment led to changes in policy 
during the initial phases of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak 
response, also triggering a debate on possible risks to 
health-care workers. Up to now, possible SARS-CoV-2 
outbreaks in health-care facilities have only been described 
using traditional molecular diagnostic tools combined with 
epidemiological data. However, previous studies 
implementing WGS have shown that hypotheses on virus 
transmission routes can be incorrect based solely on these 
data. Moreover, screening of health-care workers can be used 
to assess the level of local community transmission, but this 
can only be done if patient-to-health-care worker 
transmission can be reliably excluded.
Added value of this study
Our study aimed to gain insight in possible sources of infection 
of health-care workers at three hospitals in the Netherlands. 
All health-care workers with respiratory symptoms or fever in 
the previous 10 days were screened for SARS-CoV-2 infection. 
WGS was done of samples obtained from health-care workers 
and patients at these hospitals and this information was 
combined with epidemiological data. 
Implications of all the available evidence
At the beginning of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in the 
Netherlands, health-care workers were probably infected in the 
community rather than at the hospitals. Possible nosocomial 
outbreaks should be carefully investigated using both 
epidemiological data and WGS to exclude or confirm 
transmission in health-care facilities.
See Online for appendix 1
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(Copan, Brescia, Italy) or E-swab medium (Amies; 
Copan), following local infection control policy during 
outbreaks. At Amphia Hospital and Bravis Hospital, total 
nucleic acids were extracted for RT-PCR after an external 
lysis step (1:1 with lysis binding buffer; Roche Diagnostics, 
Almere, Netherlands), using MagnaPure96 (Roche) with 
an input volume of 500 µL and output volume of 100 µL. 
The extraction was internally controlled by addition of a 
known concentration of phocine distemper virus (PDV).12 
Subsequently, 10 μL extracted nucleic acids was amplified 
in three singleplex reactions in 25 μL final volume, using 
TaqMan Fast Virus 1-Step Master Mix (Thermofisher, 
Nieuwerkerk aan den IJssel, Netherlands), and 1 μL of 
primers and probe mixture for envelope (E) gene, RNA-
dependent RNA-polymerase gene, and PDV.13 Amplifi-
cation was done in a 7500SDS (Thermofisher) with a 
cycling profile of 5 min at 50°C, 20 s at 95°C, 45 cycles of 
3 s at 95°C, and 30 s at 58°C. At Elisabeth-TweeSteden 
Hospital, total nucleic acids were extracted, with a known 
concentration of PDV as internal control, using the 
QIAsymphony DSP virus pathogen midi kit and patho-
gen complex 400 protocol of the QIAsymphony Sample 
Processing system (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany), with an 
input volume of 400 µL and output volume of 110 µL. The 
amplification reaction was done in a volume of 25 µL 
with TaqMan Fast Virus 1-Step Master Mix (Thermofisher) 
and 10 µL extracted nucleic acids. A duplex PCR for 
E gene and PDV13,14 with optimised primer and probe 
con cen trations were done. Amplifi cation with Rotorgene 
(QIAgen) consisted of 5 min at 50°C and 15 min at 95°C 
followed by 45 cycles of 15 s at 95°C, 30 s at 60°C, and 15 s 
at 72°C. Validations of RT-PCR procedures were done 
according to Interna tional Standards Organization 
guidelines (15189).15
For WGS, samples were selected based on a cycle 
threshold value less than 32. A SARS-CoV-2-specific 
multiplex PCR for nanopore sequencing was done, as 
previously described.16 The resulting raw sequence data 
were demultiplexed using qcat. Primers were trimmed 
using cutadapt,17 after which a reference-based align-
ment to the GISAID (Global Initiative on Sharing All 
Influenza Data) sequence EPI_ISL_412973 was done using 
minimap2.18 The consensus genome was extracted and 
positions with a coverage less than 30 reads were replaced 
with N using a custom script using biopython software 
(version 1.74) and the python module pysam (version 0.15.3), 
as previously described.19 Mutations in the genome were 
confirmed by manually checking the alignment, and 
homopolymeric regions were manually checked and 
resolved, consulting the reference genome. Genomes were 
included when having greater than 90% genome coverage.
All available full-length SARS-CoV-2 genomes were 
retrieved from GISAID20 on March 20, 2020 (appendix 1 
pp 8–65), and aligned with the newly obtained SARS-CoV-2 
sequences in this study using the multiple sequence 
alignment software MUSCLE (version 3.8.1551).21 Sequences 
with more than 10% of N position replace ments were 
excluded. The alignment was manually checked for discre-
pancies, after which the phylogenomic software IQ-TREE 
(version 1.6.8)22 was used to do a maximum-likelihood 
phylogenetic analysis, with the generalised time reversible 
substitution model GTR+F+I+G4 as best pre dicted model. 
The ultrafast bootstrap option was used with 1000 replicates. 
Clusters were ascertained based on visual clustering and 
lineage designations.23
The code to generate the minimum spanning phylo-
genetic tree was written in the R pro gramming language. 
Ape24 and igraph software packages were used to write the 
code to generate the minimum spanning tree, and 
the visNetwork software package was used to generate 
the visualisation. Pairwise sequence distance (used to 
generate the network) was calculated by adding up the 
absolute nucleotide distance and indel-block distance. 
Unambiguous positions were dealt with in a pairwise 
manner. Sequences that were mistakenly identified 
as identical, because of transient connections with 
sequences containing missing data, were resolved.
The multiple sequence alignment was curated and any 
error-rich sequences or sequences without a date were 
removed. The alignment was manually inspected and 
trimmed of the 5′ and 3′ untranslated regions in the 
bioinformatics software Geneious (version 11.1.3) to 
include only coding regions. The final length of the 
alignment was 29 408 nucleotides. Bayesian phylogenetic 
trees were estimated using BEAST version 1.10.4,25 with a 
Hasegawa-Kishino-Yano nucleotide substitution model26 
and a strict molecular clock. Two independent chains 
were run for 100 million states, with a Skygrid coalescent 
prior (appendix 1 p 3).27,28 and parameters were sampled 
every 10 000 states. The LogCombiner program was used 
to combine the independent chains and to remove the 
burn-in from the tree file, and Tracer29 was used to assess 
convergence. The maximum clade credibility tree was 
inferred using the TreeAnnotator program and visualised 
using baltic code and custom python scripts.
Statistical analysis
Epidemiological data obtained at structured interviews 
were entered in Castor Electronic Data Capture, 
version 2019. Continuous variables were expressed as 
medians and ranges and categorical variables were 
summarised as numbers and percentages. All analyses 
were done with SPSS version 25.0 (IBM, Armonk, NY, 
USA). Because of the descriptive nature of our study, 
sample size calculations and analyses of significance 
were not done. Results were reported following STROBE 
guidelines for observational studies.
Role of the funding source
The funder had no role in study design, data collection, 
data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. 
The corresponding author had full access to all data in 
the study and had final responsibility for the decision to 
submit for publication.
For more on LogCombiner see 
https://beast.community/
logcombiner
For more on R see 
https://r-project.org
For more on igraph see 
https://igraph.org/
For more on visNetwork see 
https://github.com/datastorm-
open/visNetwork
For more on Geneious see 
https://geneious.com
For more on TreeAnnotator see 
https://beast.community/
treeannotator
For more on baltic see https://
github.com/evogytis/baltic
For more on qcat see https://
github.com/nanoporetech/qcat
For more on GISAID see 
https://www.gisaid.org/
For Castor Electronic Data 
Capture see https://castoredc.
com
For more on biopython see 
https://biopython.org/
For more on pysam see https://
pypi.org/project/pysam/
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Results
Between March 2 and March 12, 2020, 1796 (15%) of 
12 022 health-care workers were voluntarily screened at 
the three participating hos pitals (appendix 1 p 5). 
At Amphia Hospital, 42 (5%) of 783 health-care workers 
tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA; at Bravis Hospital, 
ten (2%) of 443 health-care workers tested positive; 
and at Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital, 44 (8%) of 
570 health-care workers tested positive. Characteristics of 
these 96 health-care workers who tested positive for 
SARS-CoV-2 RNA are shown in the table. The health-care 
workers were employed in 58 different departments, 
including on 42 medical wards. The median age of 
affected health-care workers was 49 years (range 22–66), 
and 80 (83%) of 96 were female, reflecting the proportion 
of female health-care workers among the total population 
employed in the participating hospitals (ie, 9784 of 
12 022 [81%]). 20 staff members who did not have direct 
contact with patients tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 
RNA, of whom six (30%) reported contact with colleagues 
who had also tested positive. Ten health-care workers 
reported a history of foreign travel in the 14 days before 
onset of symptoms, three (30%) of whom had travelled to 
northern Italy. 60 (63%) health-care workers had 
celebrated carnival in the 14 days before onset of 
symptoms, mostly in Breda, Prinsenbeek, and Tilburg. 
One health-care worker (who reported first symptoms on 
Feb 21, 2020) attended several carnival events while 
symptomatic but unaware of having COVID-19. 31 (32%) 
health-care workers reported close contact with an 
individual with confirmed COVID-19 in the 14 days 
before onset of symptoms, either a patient (n=3), 
colleague (n=18), household member (n=1), or another 
person outside the hospital (n=9).
Between March 2 and March 7, 2020 (Amphia Hospital), 
March 2 and March 10, 2020 (Bravis Hospital), and Feb 29 
and March 9, 2020 (Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital), 
856 patients were tested for SARS-CoV-2 RNA, of whom 
345 were at Amphia Hospital, 228 were at Bravis 
Hospital, and 283 were at Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital 
(appendix 1 p 5). 23 (3%) patients tested positive for 
SARS-CoV-2 RNA, nine at Amphia Hospital and 14 at 
Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital.
We obtained complete and near-complete SARS-CoV-2 
genomes from 50 of 96 health-care workers (appendix 1 
pp 4–5). 30 health-care workers were from Amphia 
Hospital, six were from Bravis Hospital, and 14 were 
from Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital. We obtained near-
complete SARS-CoV-2 sequences from seven patients at 
Amphia Hospital and three patients at Elisabeth-
TweeSteden Hospital.
46 (92%) of 50 sequences from health-care workers in 
this study grouped in three clusters (figure, A; appendix 1 
p 4; appendix 2). Ten (100%) of ten sequences from 
patients in the study grouped into the same three clusters: 
seven were in cluster 1, two were in cluster 2, and one 
was in cluster 3.
Cluster 1 contained 29 sequences (of which 12 were 
identical) of SARS-CoV-2 in samples taken from health-
care workers and patients at all three hospitals 
(appendix 1 p 5). 13 (45%) sequences were from Amphia 
Hospital, three (10%) were from Bravis Hospital, and 
13 (45%) were from Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital 
(figure, C). 11 (79%) of 14 health-care workers and 
two (67%) of three patients at Elisabeth-TweeSteden 
Hospital were in cluster 1.
Cluster 2 contained 20 sequences (of which ten were 
identical) of SARS-CoV-2 in samples taken from 
health-care workers and patients at all three hospitals 
(appendix 1 p 5). 17 (85%) sequences originated from 
Amphia Hospital, two (10%) were from Bravis Hospital, 
Health-care workers (n=96)
Sex
Male 16 (17%)
Female 80 (83%)
Age, years 49 (22–66)
Residence
Breda 11 (11%)
Prinsenbeek 11 (11%)
Tilburg 24 (25%)
Other city 50 (52%)
Department
Medical 76 (79%)
Staff without direct patient contact 20 (21%)
Foreign travel, 14 days before onset of 
symptoms
10 (10%)
Northern Italy 3 (3%)
Austria 3 (3%)
UK 1 (1%)
Spain 1 (1%)
Portugal 1 (1%)
Switzerland 1 (1%)
Attendance at carnival with 50 people or 
more, 14 days before onset of symptoms
60 (63%)
Breda 7 (7%)
Prinsenbeek 11 (11%)
Tilburg 20 (21%)
Other city 22 (23%)
Attendance at other event with 50 people 
or more, 14 days before onset of 
symptoms
31 (32%)
Close contact with individual with 
confirmed COVID-19, 14 days before 
onset of symptoms
31 (32%)
Patient 3 (3%)
Colleague 18 (19%)
Household member 1 (1%)
Other, outside hospital 9 (9%)
Data are n (%) or median (range).
Table: Descriptive characteristics of 96 health-care workers testing 
positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 RNA at 
three hospitals in the south of the Netherlands in March, 2020
See Online for appendix 2
Articles
www.thelancet.com/infection   Vol 20   November 2020 1277
A
Patient
Health-care worker
Other
Amphia Hospital
Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital
Bravis Hospital
Italy link
Netherlands
Other
(Figure continues on next page)
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and one (5%) was from Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital 
(figure, B). Health-care workers in cluster 2 were 
associated with Prinsenbeek and Breda, either by 
attendance at the carnival or by residence, more 
frequently compared with the other clusters (appendix 1 
p 4).
Cluster 3 contained seven sequences (of which four were 
identical) of SARS-CoV-2 in samples taken from health-
care workers and patients at all three hospitals. Four 
sequences were from health-care workers at Amphia 
hospital and one each was from Bravis Hospital and 
Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital. One sequence from a 
patient at Elisabeth-TweeSteden Hospital was also included 
in this cluster. A relatively large proportion of sequences in 
cluster 3 were from people with a travel history to northern 
Italy, as described elsewhere.16 However, only two of six 
health-care workers in this cluster reported recent travel to 
either Italy or Austria (appendix 1 pp 4, 6–7).
Within each cluster, identical or near-identical 
sequences in health-care workers at the same hospital, 
and between patients and health-care workers at the 
same hospital, were found, but no consistent link was 
noted among health-care workers on the same ward or 
between health-care workers and patients on the same 
ward. Most (81–100%) health-care workers testing 
positive for SARS-CoV-2 at the three hospitals did not 
work on a ward with patients with confirmed COVID-19 
(appendix 1 p 2). In wards with patients and health-care 
workers infected with SARS-CoV-2, direct transmission 
could be excluded in most cases, based on available 
WGS data (appendix 1 p 2). Notably, in Bravis Hospital, 
no patients with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection were 
hospitalised within 2 days before health-care workers at 
that hospital reported onset of symptoms. Additionally, 
no clusters were reported of more than three health-
care workers on the same ward with identical or near-
identical (two nucleotide difference or less) sequences. 
However, we cannot exclude health-care workers being 
infected in common hospital areas such as staff 
restaurants.
Figure: Minimum spanning tree of available full-length SARS-CoV-2 genomes obtained from GISAID on March 20, 2020
The full tree (A) shows three clusters of SARS-CoV-2 genomes, obtained from sequencing samples from health-care workers and patients in the south of the 
Netherlands in March, 2020. An interactive version of the full tree can be found in appendix 2; it can be accessed by unzipping and opening the visNetwork.html 
file. Clusters 2 (B) and 1 (C) are shown in more detail. Numbers next to nodes indicate the number of sequences included. Numbers on branches indicate the 
difference in number of nucleotides between sequences. SARS-CoV-2=severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. GISAID=Global Initiative on Sharing All 
Influenza Data.
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Discussion
In the present study, we combined epidemiological data 
with WGS to obtain a deeper understanding of the 
sources and modes of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 at 
three hospitals in the south of the Netherlands, which 
were the first hospitals to identify patients with COVID-19 
in the Netherlands. Although possible hospital trans-
mission of SARS-CoV-2 and health-care workers with 
COVID-19 have been reported,3,30,31 to our knowledge, our 
study is the first to use WGS to analyse possible 
SARS-CoV-2 nosocomial transmission. Infection of 
health-care workers could have occurred through foreign 
travel, community contacts, or nosocomial transmission. 
The epidemiological data we obtained, combined with 
the presence of identical viruses in all three hospitals, 
and with non-hospitalised cases in other locations, 
indicates widespread community transmission in a very 
early phase of the outbreak. Mass gatherings, such as 
carnivals, in which just under two-thirds of health-care 
workers testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 participated, 
possibly acted as local super-spreading events.
Health-care workers are at increased risk of being 
exposed to viruses within hospitals but can also be a 
source of transmission by introducing a virus into their 
hospital. SARS-CoV-2 infections in health-care workers 
can have a substantial effect, because pathogens are 
introduced into settings with high numbers of individuals 
with comorbidities, potentially causing high morbidity 
and mortality among patients. The current study did not 
find evidence of large-scale nosocomial transmission in 
the early phase of the Dutch outbreak, and prevailing use 
of PPE and other infectious disease prevention measures 
were considered sufficient based on these early analyses 
and results.32
Outbreaks in health-care settings are traditionally 
investigated by molecular diagnostic methods combined 
with epidemiological data. However, previous studies 
using WGS for hospital outbreak investigations have 
shown that hypotheses on virus transmission routes can 
be incorrect based solely on these data. By adding WGS 
data, particularly if results can be generated in a timely 
manner, and as long as sufficient reference sequences 
are available to allow a high resolution of the findings, 
the sequence analysis can provide essential information 
and inform subsequent infection control measures.33
The mutation rate of SARS-CoV-2 is estimated to be 
around 1·16 × 10–³ substitutions per site per year, which 
corresponds to around one mutation every 2 weeks.34 
Therefore, finding identical or near-identical sequences 
in several locations and hospitals makes it difficult to 
draw definite conclusions on individual direct health-
care worker-to-health-care worker or health-care worker-
to-patient transmissions based on sequence data alone 
in this early stage of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, when 
genetic diversity of the circulating pathogen was 
negligible. Moreover, we did not obtain WGS of all 
health-care workers and patients testing positive for 
SARS-CoV-2 and, because of the small sample size, our 
analyses should be interpreted with caution. However, 
the finding of diverse clusters does exclude infection 
from one source. Moreover, the sequence-based analysis 
could be biased when sampling and sequencing is not 
done systematically and when sequence data in some 
areas are scarce, as is the case for COVID-19 inter-
nationally. For the Netherlands, we sequenced a sub-
stantial proportion of SARS-CoV-2 genomes as part of 
the national public health response,16 which was used as 
a reference set.
In conclusion, the genomic diversity recorded in our 
study is consistent with multiple introductions through 
community-acquired infections, and some local ampli-
fication related to specific social events in the community, 
rather than widespread within-hospital transmission. 
Although direct transmission in hospitals cannot be 
ruled out, our data do not support widespread nosocomial 
transmission as the source of infection in patients or 
health-care workers in our study. Because of the near-real-
time sequence generation and analysis, our information 
was rapidly shared within the Dutch out break manage-
ment team. Partly based on these data, SARS-CoV-2 was 
concluded to have already spread in the population in the 
province of North Brabant, which led to a change of 
policy, in which containment measures were comple-
mented by targeted physical distance measures, starting 
in the south of the Netherlands initially and later 
comprising the whole country.16
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